Through the Shadows: Covert Operations & Morality

When it comes to the debate surrounding the morality of one country intervening in the internal and democratic affairs of another country it would appear as though much of the focus has been on the use of military force, with little attention paid to the clandestine tactics that were employed during the Cold War era. While military intervention, in cases such as genocide and acts of aggression, are obvious justifications for the use of force, there are still murky areas to be explored when it comes to the covert operations used by the United States as a means to stop the spread of communism in Chile. Though it’s possible that there were numerous moral justifications for many of the actions during this time in history, as it could’ve been quite devastating if the Soviet Union and communism took over Central and South America, however, the United States was most likely wrong in intervening in the internal and democratic dealings of the Chilean people. The reason is that the United States disregarded the democratic principles of another country by instigating and supporting, through covert means, the overthrow of a democratically elected government, which resulted in the suffering and loss of freedoms of the citizens of Chile, and in doing so the U.S. government created a double-standard that could never be seen as universally applicable.


For some, the unmistakable criticism will be that many necessary evils took place during the Cold War, and the Soviet Union no longer exists, therefore, it’s useless to scrutinize these events today. In response, one should understand the history of covert operations in Latin America, as well as the repercussions such methods have spawned in the region. Such as the extreme amount of distrust, hostility, and anti-American sentiments in countries like Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela. In addition, one should be able to comprehend the evolution and current use of covert ops, as well as understand that there are numerous unforeseen problems that may occur wherever these methods are employed. According to David Dent’s book, Historical Dictionary of U.S.-Latin American Relations, “[c]overt operations declined after the Cold War,” but with the new preemptive strike doctrine that was established by the Bush administration, “executive branch secrecy in the conduct of foreign affairs” has once again become the norm (133-134). Although this isn’t meant to be a criticism about Bush’s war on terrorism or Obama’s current use of the preemptive strike doctrine in Pakistan, it’s however, a reminder of where covert operations came from. By analyzing a case, such as the coup in Chile, one will hopefully understand the immoral nature of covert operations, and with any luck give a much needed perspective into the future exercise of methods that intervene in the internal and democratic affairs of other countries.


To begin, it’s important to understand that Chile had a strong democratic foundation prior to the coup in 1973. The strength of Chilean democracy was due to the multiparty system that allowed a large number of diverse voices to be represented and heard in the different branches of government. From about the 1920’s to about the early 1960’s “fifty different parties…gained representation in the national congress” (Tomasek 399). Surely, this collage of various ideologies and opinions created a vibrant democratic system. Dent further highlights the strength of Chilean politics when he writes:

…Chile was one of Latin America’s most durable democracies, consistently ranked in the top three by a panel of U.S. political scientists… Chile’s stable democracy had followed institutionalized constitutional procedures, upheld the rule of law, promoted civil liberties, tolerated political dissent, and held regular elections. (345)

During this time, citizens of Chile exercised their guaranteed democratic rights, voting for parties and candidates that they felt best captured the direction their nation should be headed. In 1958, it appeared as though Chileans where beginning to sway to the left ideologically because “Salvador Allende, a Marxist communist candidate, nearly won the presidential election” (Carlisle 124). This left leaning tendency was a new phenomenon in Chile, and it only grew over the next twelve years. By 1970, Allende was elected president, and much like any democracy the nation was split. While Allende’s supporters welcomed the agenda of his administration, the opposition feared the spread of communism. However, this didn’t amount to much as the Marxist message was only growing, and by the congressional elections in “March 1973… Allende’s coalition won 44 percent of the votes, a greater percentage than it had won in 1970” (Carlisle 124). Although the people of Chile were using their right to determine the outcome of their own nation, back in the U.S., the Nixon administration was shaping a plan that would forever change the fate of the Chilean people.


Through covert operations, the United States began implementing schemes that would deal with Allende’s government, while simultaneously disregarding the democratic principles of Chile. The problem was due to Allende’s “political platform and Marxist ideology” evoking anger and fear that the United States would lose its influence in the country (Dent 9). The Nixon administration’s feelings were summed up quite well when Former National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger said, “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people” (Dent 268). Such an arrogant statement made it crystal clear that that the United States only wanted to deal with governments that were “reliably anti-communist rather than democratic” (Reid 82). Washington’s utter contempt for the democratic principles of the Chilean people began to manifest itself. In an attempt to challenge the communist wave in Chile, the United States planned to, as Kissinger put it, “make the economy scream,” by cutting U.S. economic aid to virtually nothing, in order to manufacture financial troubles for Chile and “force Allende to change his left-wing policies” (Carlisle 124). In addition, the U.S. began “increase[ing] its military aid to Chilean dissidents and expand[ing] the training of Chilean military personnel” – an ominous sign of things to come (Carlisle 124). However, the Nixon administration needed to produce even more anti-Allende sentiments before the social turmoil would be enough to topple the communist regime, and in order to do this, “the CIA encouraged and aided labor strikes in the country” (Carlisle 124). The combination of all of these actions equated to a festering of civil unrest, which prepared the extreme-right within Chile for, what they thought would be, a return to the days before Allende’s Marxist ideology. Nevertheless, Allende didn’t let up on his agenda, and as a result of Nixon’s disregard for the democratic principles of other countries, the pillars of the long standing democracy in Chile came crumbling down. On September 11, 1973, Allende’s presidency was cut short by a “U.S.-backed coup that ushered in seventeen years of military dictatorship under General Augusto Pinochet” (Dent 9). Certainly, the U.S. led deconstruction of Chile’s democracy appears to be immoral, but is it still possible that the United States could be morally justified from the principle of utility?


Though many who defend covert operations often recite the principle of utility as a morally justifying theory that will aid their stance, it’s possible that this approach still remains unethical. According to philosopher and author of Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill, the principle of utility dictates that:

…actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. (9)

In other words, if an individual was to subscribe to this principle than, an action would only be right as long as one was to take into consideration, not only one’s own happiness, but the happiness of all other parties involved – weighing both sides in order to determine the right course of action. For instance, some may belief that the U.S. was justified in overthrowing the Marxist government of Chile due to the fact that the world is better without communism being so widespread. Those who share this belief could likely argue that there would have been a domino effect in Latin America had Allende’s government not been overthrown, and that the United States could’ve collapsed or, at the very least, been weakened by the spread of communism. However, the problem with this line of thought is that it utilizes hypothetical scenarios as evidence that may or may not have happened. Furthermore, if one is to explore the realm of possibilities than it’s likely to conclude that there is an infinite regress of scenarios. What’s more, within the vast universe of scenarios there would be plenty that would disprove the morality in their argument. Such as, a possible reality where a domino effect wouldn’t have occurred even if Chile did turn completely communist, or where the collapse of the Soviet Union was a possibility regardless of Allende’s continued rule, and in either case the end result isn’t the toppling of a democratically elected government.


Additionally, this argument disregards what actually happened, namely, the suffering and loss of freedoms that the Chilean people experienced due to this action. In his review of Luz Arce’s book, The Inferno: A Story of Terror and Survival in Chile, Journal of Third World Studies writer J Patrice McSherry, states that citizens were forced to endure a “clandestine system of disappearance-detention-torture-killing centers, run by the military command” (McSherry). According to Washington Post writer Pamela Constable, within this system, many Chileans suffered having their “fingernails pulled out, electric shocks applied to [their] genitals,” and experienced the grotesque and heinous act of “mock-rape by dogs” (Constable). Those who walked away from Pinochet’s gulags were psychologically scarred for the rest of his rule, as “torturers set out to not only physically eliminate political enemies but also to degrade and destroy the psyches of those” the torturers allowed to live (McSherry). Some estimate that approximately “3,000 opponents of the dictatorship were killed, and another 1,000 disappeared in the military’s effort to save Chile from communism” (Dent 346). In addition, during Pinochet’s 17 year reign of terror he “abolished political parties, dissolved Congress, banned union activities, and suppressed civil liberties” (Carlisle 125). It would seem that in order to give weight to the principle of utility you would have to look not only at what was beneficial to the United States, but also at the pain that resulted from the coup. Clearly, if one was to do that they’d likely understand that the real world suffering and loss of freedoms, which Chileans endured, outweigh the countless fictional scenarios that were produced as justification.


Finally, one can examine the morality of the actions of the Nixon administration by turning to the principle of universality. Noam Chomsky, Professor of Linguistics at MIT, and critic of U.S. actions in the Middle East and Latin America, suggests that, “[w]e should apply to ourselves the same standards we apply to others – in fact, more stringent ones” (89). Chomsky goes on to relate this to U.S. actions when he says, “if states have the power to do so with impunity, they disdain moral truisms, declaring themselves uniquely exempt from the principle of universality” (89). Professor Chomsky’s statements are likely based off Immanuel Kant’s, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. In this work, Kant explains the main tenet for his moral theory, and that is one should “[a]ct only according to the maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (Kant 30). For instance, whenever a person undertakes such an action, or maxim, such as always telling the truth, the individual is creating a universal law for everyone to act the same way. That is to say, in choosing to tell the truth from an obligation to a moral rule an individual is willing that every person should do the same. Many will likely point out, governments cannot be regarded as individuals, thus, moral rules, which apply to individuals, shouldn’t apply to an artificial entity like a government. According to ethicist Jan Narveson, while “states aren’t individuals…they are, instead, groups of individuals” (Regan 146). If one were to look at those who would be privy to the actions in Chile, it’s likely that this group gets progressively smaller the more classified the material gets. Since that is likely the case, the logical assumption would be that the upper echelons of power in the Nixon administration would be small enough to suggest that a handful of people were making these decisions, and therefore, these decision makers, who represent the government, are subject to moral theories that deal with individuals.


When it comes to the Kantian concept of morality, which Chomsky has applied to the U.S. government, the standard of a good deed states that action X is right every time given whatever circumstance may occur, but the standard that Washington has created would be morally debased. To be more precise, the U.S. government’s actions in Chile dictated a standard to the rest of the world that a government’s legitimacy should come from outside of a nation not from within, and that such an act is justifiably good if the new government is a much better match or is more suitable for one’s own interests. However, the paradox lies in the fact that the U.S. government would never accept this form of thinking if the outside government wasn’t the United States. For instance, what if Chile would’ve done this to the United States based off the fear of western ideologies spreading through the world, used similar covert tactics to instigate a coup, which disregarded the democratic principles of the U.S., and as a result a brutal dictator took over for seventeen years? If the act isn’t applicable to all countries, including the U.S., than it could never be seen as a morally justified action because one would essentially be creating a double-standard, whereby, one country could do action X but another could not.


In order to truly appreciate the immorality of this double-standard one must step outside the passions linked to nationalism, and with this in mind, it’s best to imagine Maria’s perspective. Maria was one of many proud Chilean citizens who voted for President Allende in 1970. She tirelessly canvassed for Allende, going door to door spreading the word to her neighbors. It appeared as though her hard work had paid off, as she now stood in a sea of devoted supporters, eyes fixed at a podium, waiting patiently to hear the newly elected President of Chile give his victory speech. It was Maria’s first time voting and her chest swelled with excitement as her candidate of choice was about to utter his first words since it was announced that Salvador Allende would be the next president of Chile. She was so proud that she was able to cast her vote to elect who she felt was the best man for the job. She smiled at the fact that she was able to take part in the long standing democratic tradition that has been an essential element of Chilean culture for so many years. Tiny droplets of water rolled down her cheek as she thought of the countless nations that were unable to experience the freedoms that were guaranteed to her through democracy. Her hand quickly brushed her face, wiping away the salty stream, as her eye’s once again lit up with joy as President-elect Allende took the stage. The audience roared with delight. On September 11, 1973, the roar of gun fire, tanks, and cries for help can be heard outside Maria’s kitchen. She hides underneath a table with her father and baby sister, while the military coup takes place outside. It wasn’t until many years later that she found out that the United States had a hand in the coup, and Maria recalled another concept of Kant’s: “No State Shall interfere by force in the constitution and government of another state,” and such “interference would be an actual offense which would so far tend to render the autonomy of all states insecure” (Wood 438). Maria had always thought this to be true, as she knew if her democracy was in danger than so was democracy everywhere. Unfortunately for Maria, the real world didn’t share her beliefs on that particular day. By 1979, Maria was living in constant fear, as countless loved ones had disappeared at the hands of Pinochet’s secret police. Her own father had been imprisoned for allegedly plotting with communists to overthrow the government, a common accusation that was tossed around like a softball. As she sat at her kitchen table waiting for her baby sister to safely return home from school, she began to pray silently. She prayed her father wouldn’t suffer the same fate as her cousin, Mario, who had been tortured and killed on a similar charge. Her heart sank, as she thought of not attending her father’s funeral due to the horror of being arrested out of suspicion of being a communist sympathizer and co-conspirator. Fighting back her emotions, she picked up the newspaper and read an article about Henry Kissinger’s recent visit with Pinochet. She skimmed the page, and found a quote of Kissinger’s: “we’re sympathetic to what you are trying to do here” (Dent 268). Maria’s lip quivered as she folded the paper and stirred her coffee.


Clearly, the point of Maria’s story is to express a scenario that allows one to step into her shoes, experiencing the blatant disregard for her countries democratic principles, as well as to live through the suffering and loss of freedoms that people like her might have endured during Pinochet’s rule. After walking in her shoes can one still suggest that it was morally justified for the U.S. to instigate and support the overthrow of Allende’s government? Certainly, anyone can see that such actions cannot be universally acceptable, as any rational individual would never want to experience this, making this particular use of covert operations highly unethical. Unquestionably, there are other criteria that could be added so as to establish whether or not covert operations are morally justifiable. However, respecting the democratic principles of other nations, looking at the suffering and loss of freedoms produced by the action, as well as seeing if the action undertaken can be universally applied, are all useful tools for creating a sound and logical foundation for analyzing these actions. Moreover, by applying these standards to the actions’ of the United States in Chile one will likely be able to see how immoral covert operations can be, and this should create a technique in comparing these events to the future use of these tactics. Through these principles one can hopefully obtain a workable model that will grant the ability to understand the morality of covert operations. The relevancy of this issue is still true, as one could likely suggest that the preemptive strike doctrine and war on terror are the covert operations and cold war of our day. That’s why it’s of the utmost importance to understand the wrong doings of the past in order to prepare for the ethical discussions of the future.

Works Cited

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Constable, Pamela. “Chile’s Gen. Pinochet, The Strongman Who Tore Apart His Country.” Washington Post. 12 Dec. 2006. The Washington Post Company. Web. 27 Jun. 2010.
Dent, David W.. “Allende, Salvador.” Historical Dictionary of U.S.-Latin American Relations.1st ed. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2005: 9 .Print.
Dent, David W.. “Covert Operations.” Historical Dictionary of U.S.-Latin American Relations.1st ed. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2005: 133-134 .Print.
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Reid, Michael. Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007: 82. Print.
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