U.S. War Games Threaten China's Regional Stability

It would appear that N. Korea isn't the only country that voiced their concern about the joint U.S.-S. Korean military exercise that took place recently. In fact, according to The Los Angeles Times:

...China's state-controlled media have been beating the drums of war with editorials, each more confrontational than the last.

"What will Americans feel if the Chinese or Russian military travel across the ocean to hold their exercises in the high seas not far from the coast of Florida, New York or California?" demanded an editorial writer in Tuesday's English-language China Daily.

It's likely that with the continued rise of China's power, actions undertaken by the United States, especially those that constitute acts of military might within China's immediate sphere of regional influence, will no longer be seen as acceptable. A justifiable reaction when you consider that "[t]he U.S.-South Korean exercises — the largest in more than three decades — involved 8,000 military personnel, 20 warships and 200 aircraft, including the aircraft carrier George Washington."

Only time will tell how this political theater will play out in the future, as the the China-U.S. military dance will continue for some time to come.

View full article here

Through the Shadows: Covert Operations & Morality

When it comes to the debate surrounding the morality of one country intervening in the internal and democratic affairs of another country it would appear as though much of the focus has been on the use of military force, with little attention paid to the clandestine tactics that were employed during the Cold War era. While military intervention, in cases such as genocide and acts of aggression, are obvious justifications for the use of force, there are still murky areas to be explored when it comes to the covert operations used by the United States as a means to stop the spread of communism in Chile. Though it’s possible that there were numerous moral justifications for many of the actions during this time in history, as it could’ve been quite devastating if the Soviet Union and communism took over Central and South America, however, the United States was most likely wrong in intervening in the internal and democratic dealings of the Chilean people. The reason is that the United States disregarded the democratic principles of another country by instigating and supporting, through covert means, the overthrow of a democratically elected government, which resulted in the suffering and loss of freedoms of the citizens of Chile, and in doing so the U.S. government created a double-standard that could never be seen as universally applicable.


For some, the unmistakable criticism will be that many necessary evils took place during the Cold War, and the Soviet Union no longer exists, therefore, it’s useless to scrutinize these events today. In response, one should understand the history of covert operations in Latin America, as well as the repercussions such methods have spawned in the region. Such as the extreme amount of distrust, hostility, and anti-American sentiments in countries like Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela. In addition, one should be able to comprehend the evolution and current use of covert ops, as well as understand that there are numerous unforeseen problems that may occur wherever these methods are employed. According to David Dent’s book, Historical Dictionary of U.S.-Latin American Relations, “[c]overt operations declined after the Cold War,” but with the new preemptive strike doctrine that was established by the Bush administration, “executive branch secrecy in the conduct of foreign affairs” has once again become the norm (133-134). Although this isn’t meant to be a criticism about Bush’s war on terrorism or Obama’s current use of the preemptive strike doctrine in Pakistan, it’s however, a reminder of where covert operations came from. By analyzing a case, such as the coup in Chile, one will hopefully understand the immoral nature of covert operations, and with any luck give a much needed perspective into the future exercise of methods that intervene in the internal and democratic affairs of other countries.


To begin, it’s important to understand that Chile had a strong democratic foundation prior to the coup in 1973. The strength of Chilean democracy was due to the multiparty system that allowed a large number of diverse voices to be represented and heard in the different branches of government. From about the 1920’s to about the early 1960’s “fifty different parties…gained representation in the national congress” (Tomasek 399). Surely, this collage of various ideologies and opinions created a vibrant democratic system. Dent further highlights the strength of Chilean politics when he writes:

…Chile was one of Latin America’s most durable democracies, consistently ranked in the top three by a panel of U.S. political scientists… Chile’s stable democracy had followed institutionalized constitutional procedures, upheld the rule of law, promoted civil liberties, tolerated political dissent, and held regular elections. (345)

During this time, citizens of Chile exercised their guaranteed democratic rights, voting for parties and candidates that they felt best captured the direction their nation should be headed. In 1958, it appeared as though Chileans where beginning to sway to the left ideologically because “Salvador Allende, a Marxist communist candidate, nearly won the presidential election” (Carlisle 124). This left leaning tendency was a new phenomenon in Chile, and it only grew over the next twelve years. By 1970, Allende was elected president, and much like any democracy the nation was split. While Allende’s supporters welcomed the agenda of his administration, the opposition feared the spread of communism. However, this didn’t amount to much as the Marxist message was only growing, and by the congressional elections in “March 1973… Allende’s coalition won 44 percent of the votes, a greater percentage than it had won in 1970” (Carlisle 124). Although the people of Chile were using their right to determine the outcome of their own nation, back in the U.S., the Nixon administration was shaping a plan that would forever change the fate of the Chilean people.


Through covert operations, the United States began implementing schemes that would deal with Allende’s government, while simultaneously disregarding the democratic principles of Chile. The problem was due to Allende’s “political platform and Marxist ideology” evoking anger and fear that the United States would lose its influence in the country (Dent 9). The Nixon administration’s feelings were summed up quite well when Former National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger said, “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people” (Dent 268). Such an arrogant statement made it crystal clear that that the United States only wanted to deal with governments that were “reliably anti-communist rather than democratic” (Reid 82). Washington’s utter contempt for the democratic principles of the Chilean people began to manifest itself. In an attempt to challenge the communist wave in Chile, the United States planned to, as Kissinger put it, “make the economy scream,” by cutting U.S. economic aid to virtually nothing, in order to manufacture financial troubles for Chile and “force Allende to change his left-wing policies” (Carlisle 124). In addition, the U.S. began “increase[ing] its military aid to Chilean dissidents and expand[ing] the training of Chilean military personnel” – an ominous sign of things to come (Carlisle 124). However, the Nixon administration needed to produce even more anti-Allende sentiments before the social turmoil would be enough to topple the communist regime, and in order to do this, “the CIA encouraged and aided labor strikes in the country” (Carlisle 124). The combination of all of these actions equated to a festering of civil unrest, which prepared the extreme-right within Chile for, what they thought would be, a return to the days before Allende’s Marxist ideology. Nevertheless, Allende didn’t let up on his agenda, and as a result of Nixon’s disregard for the democratic principles of other countries, the pillars of the long standing democracy in Chile came crumbling down. On September 11, 1973, Allende’s presidency was cut short by a “U.S.-backed coup that ushered in seventeen years of military dictatorship under General Augusto Pinochet” (Dent 9). Certainly, the U.S. led deconstruction of Chile’s democracy appears to be immoral, but is it still possible that the United States could be morally justified from the principle of utility?


Though many who defend covert operations often recite the principle of utility as a morally justifying theory that will aid their stance, it’s possible that this approach still remains unethical. According to philosopher and author of Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill, the principle of utility dictates that:

…actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. (9)

In other words, if an individual was to subscribe to this principle than, an action would only be right as long as one was to take into consideration, not only one’s own happiness, but the happiness of all other parties involved – weighing both sides in order to determine the right course of action. For instance, some may belief that the U.S. was justified in overthrowing the Marxist government of Chile due to the fact that the world is better without communism being so widespread. Those who share this belief could likely argue that there would have been a domino effect in Latin America had Allende’s government not been overthrown, and that the United States could’ve collapsed or, at the very least, been weakened by the spread of communism. However, the problem with this line of thought is that it utilizes hypothetical scenarios as evidence that may or may not have happened. Furthermore, if one is to explore the realm of possibilities than it’s likely to conclude that there is an infinite regress of scenarios. What’s more, within the vast universe of scenarios there would be plenty that would disprove the morality in their argument. Such as, a possible reality where a domino effect wouldn’t have occurred even if Chile did turn completely communist, or where the collapse of the Soviet Union was a possibility regardless of Allende’s continued rule, and in either case the end result isn’t the toppling of a democratically elected government.


Additionally, this argument disregards what actually happened, namely, the suffering and loss of freedoms that the Chilean people experienced due to this action. In his review of Luz Arce’s book, The Inferno: A Story of Terror and Survival in Chile, Journal of Third World Studies writer J Patrice McSherry, states that citizens were forced to endure a “clandestine system of disappearance-detention-torture-killing centers, run by the military command” (McSherry). According to Washington Post writer Pamela Constable, within this system, many Chileans suffered having their “fingernails pulled out, electric shocks applied to [their] genitals,” and experienced the grotesque and heinous act of “mock-rape by dogs” (Constable). Those who walked away from Pinochet’s gulags were psychologically scarred for the rest of his rule, as “torturers set out to not only physically eliminate political enemies but also to degrade and destroy the psyches of those” the torturers allowed to live (McSherry). Some estimate that approximately “3,000 opponents of the dictatorship were killed, and another 1,000 disappeared in the military’s effort to save Chile from communism” (Dent 346). In addition, during Pinochet’s 17 year reign of terror he “abolished political parties, dissolved Congress, banned union activities, and suppressed civil liberties” (Carlisle 125). It would seem that in order to give weight to the principle of utility you would have to look not only at what was beneficial to the United States, but also at the pain that resulted from the coup. Clearly, if one was to do that they’d likely understand that the real world suffering and loss of freedoms, which Chileans endured, outweigh the countless fictional scenarios that were produced as justification.


Finally, one can examine the morality of the actions of the Nixon administration by turning to the principle of universality. Noam Chomsky, Professor of Linguistics at MIT, and critic of U.S. actions in the Middle East and Latin America, suggests that, “[w]e should apply to ourselves the same standards we apply to others – in fact, more stringent ones” (89). Chomsky goes on to relate this to U.S. actions when he says, “if states have the power to do so with impunity, they disdain moral truisms, declaring themselves uniquely exempt from the principle of universality” (89). Professor Chomsky’s statements are likely based off Immanuel Kant’s, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. In this work, Kant explains the main tenet for his moral theory, and that is one should “[a]ct only according to the maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law (Kant 30). For instance, whenever a person undertakes such an action, or maxim, such as always telling the truth, the individual is creating a universal law for everyone to act the same way. That is to say, in choosing to tell the truth from an obligation to a moral rule an individual is willing that every person should do the same. Many will likely point out, governments cannot be regarded as individuals, thus, moral rules, which apply to individuals, shouldn’t apply to an artificial entity like a government. According to ethicist Jan Narveson, while “states aren’t individuals…they are, instead, groups of individuals” (Regan 146). If one were to look at those who would be privy to the actions in Chile, it’s likely that this group gets progressively smaller the more classified the material gets. Since that is likely the case, the logical assumption would be that the upper echelons of power in the Nixon administration would be small enough to suggest that a handful of people were making these decisions, and therefore, these decision makers, who represent the government, are subject to moral theories that deal with individuals.


When it comes to the Kantian concept of morality, which Chomsky has applied to the U.S. government, the standard of a good deed states that action X is right every time given whatever circumstance may occur, but the standard that Washington has created would be morally debased. To be more precise, the U.S. government’s actions in Chile dictated a standard to the rest of the world that a government’s legitimacy should come from outside of a nation not from within, and that such an act is justifiably good if the new government is a much better match or is more suitable for one’s own interests. However, the paradox lies in the fact that the U.S. government would never accept this form of thinking if the outside government wasn’t the United States. For instance, what if Chile would’ve done this to the United States based off the fear of western ideologies spreading through the world, used similar covert tactics to instigate a coup, which disregarded the democratic principles of the U.S., and as a result a brutal dictator took over for seventeen years? If the act isn’t applicable to all countries, including the U.S., than it could never be seen as a morally justified action because one would essentially be creating a double-standard, whereby, one country could do action X but another could not.


In order to truly appreciate the immorality of this double-standard one must step outside the passions linked to nationalism, and with this in mind, it’s best to imagine Maria’s perspective. Maria was one of many proud Chilean citizens who voted for President Allende in 1970. She tirelessly canvassed for Allende, going door to door spreading the word to her neighbors. It appeared as though her hard work had paid off, as she now stood in a sea of devoted supporters, eyes fixed at a podium, waiting patiently to hear the newly elected President of Chile give his victory speech. It was Maria’s first time voting and her chest swelled with excitement as her candidate of choice was about to utter his first words since it was announced that Salvador Allende would be the next president of Chile. She was so proud that she was able to cast her vote to elect who she felt was the best man for the job. She smiled at the fact that she was able to take part in the long standing democratic tradition that has been an essential element of Chilean culture for so many years. Tiny droplets of water rolled down her cheek as she thought of the countless nations that were unable to experience the freedoms that were guaranteed to her through democracy. Her hand quickly brushed her face, wiping away the salty stream, as her eye’s once again lit up with joy as President-elect Allende took the stage. The audience roared with delight. On September 11, 1973, the roar of gun fire, tanks, and cries for help can be heard outside Maria’s kitchen. She hides underneath a table with her father and baby sister, while the military coup takes place outside. It wasn’t until many years later that she found out that the United States had a hand in the coup, and Maria recalled another concept of Kant’s: “No State Shall interfere by force in the constitution and government of another state,” and such “interference would be an actual offense which would so far tend to render the autonomy of all states insecure” (Wood 438). Maria had always thought this to be true, as she knew if her democracy was in danger than so was democracy everywhere. Unfortunately for Maria, the real world didn’t share her beliefs on that particular day. By 1979, Maria was living in constant fear, as countless loved ones had disappeared at the hands of Pinochet’s secret police. Her own father had been imprisoned for allegedly plotting with communists to overthrow the government, a common accusation that was tossed around like a softball. As she sat at her kitchen table waiting for her baby sister to safely return home from school, she began to pray silently. She prayed her father wouldn’t suffer the same fate as her cousin, Mario, who had been tortured and killed on a similar charge. Her heart sank, as she thought of not attending her father’s funeral due to the horror of being arrested out of suspicion of being a communist sympathizer and co-conspirator. Fighting back her emotions, she picked up the newspaper and read an article about Henry Kissinger’s recent visit with Pinochet. She skimmed the page, and found a quote of Kissinger’s: “we’re sympathetic to what you are trying to do here” (Dent 268). Maria’s lip quivered as she folded the paper and stirred her coffee.


Clearly, the point of Maria’s story is to express a scenario that allows one to step into her shoes, experiencing the blatant disregard for her countries democratic principles, as well as to live through the suffering and loss of freedoms that people like her might have endured during Pinochet’s rule. After walking in her shoes can one still suggest that it was morally justified for the U.S. to instigate and support the overthrow of Allende’s government? Certainly, anyone can see that such actions cannot be universally acceptable, as any rational individual would never want to experience this, making this particular use of covert operations highly unethical. Unquestionably, there are other criteria that could be added so as to establish whether or not covert operations are morally justifiable. However, respecting the democratic principles of other nations, looking at the suffering and loss of freedoms produced by the action, as well as seeing if the action undertaken can be universally applied, are all useful tools for creating a sound and logical foundation for analyzing these actions. Moreover, by applying these standards to the actions’ of the United States in Chile one will likely be able to see how immoral covert operations can be, and this should create a technique in comparing these events to the future use of these tactics. Through these principles one can hopefully obtain a workable model that will grant the ability to understand the morality of covert operations. The relevancy of this issue is still true, as one could likely suggest that the preemptive strike doctrine and war on terror are the covert operations and cold war of our day. That’s why it’s of the utmost importance to understand the wrong doings of the past in order to prepare for the ethical discussions of the future.

Works Cited

Carlisle, Rodney P., ed. “Chile.” Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol. 1 of Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 2 vols. Armonk, New York: Sharpe Reference, 2005: 124-125. Print.
Chomsky, Noam. Interventions. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2007: 89. Print
Constable, Pamela. “Chile’s Gen. Pinochet, The Strongman Who Tore Apart His Country.” Washington Post. 12 Dec. 2006. The Washington Post Company. Web. 27 Jun. 2010.
Dent, David W.. “Allende, Salvador.” Historical Dictionary of U.S.-Latin American Relations.1st ed. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2005: 9 .Print.
Dent, David W.. “Covert Operations.” Historical Dictionary of U.S.-Latin American Relations.1st ed. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2005: 133-134 .Print.
Dent, David W.. “Kissinger, Henry.” Historical Dictionary of U.S.-Latin American Relations.1st ed. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2005: 268 .Print.
Dent, David W.. “Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto.” Historical Dictionary of U.S.-Latin American Relations.1st ed. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2005: 345-346.Print.
Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals with On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns. 3rd ed. Trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993: 30. Print.
McSherry, J Patrice. "The Inferno: A Story of Terror and Survival in Chile. " Rev. of: Journal of Third World Studies 22.2 (2005): 287-289. Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 30 Jun. 2010.
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Ed. Oskar Piest. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1957: 9. Print.
Regan, Tom, ed. Matters Of Life And Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosphy. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993: 146. Print.
Reid, Michael. Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007: 82. Print.
Tomasek, Robert D., ed. Latin American Politics: 24 Studies of the Contemporary Scene. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966: 399. Print.
Wood, Allen W., ed. Basic Writings of Kant. New York: The Modern Library, 2001: 438. Print.

Bad Relations: Even Dictators Can Have Trust Issues

Within the past decade diplomatic relations between the U. S. and Venezuela have become increasingly difficult to manage, and even though President Obama has taken a different approach to this issue then the previous administration, it would appear that matters aren’t getting any better as Venezuela is now partnering itself with Russia. Indeed, much of the past problems can be attributed to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a dictator who has been running on an anti-American platform ever since he was elected to office in 1998, and who has threatened numerous times to cut off the “1.2 billion barrels” of oil that the U.S. receives daily from Venezuela in order to influence policy (Romero). Though it would be easy to place all the blame on Chavez, the problems facing this relationship can’t simply be placed on his lap alone, as some of the problems might be due to U.S. actions in the region, creating severe trust issues. In fact, President Chavez’s distrust of the United States might be based off three factors: Chavez’s historical perspective of the U.S. within Latin America, the past relationship between Venezuela and the Bush administration, and the growing U.S.-Colombian alliance. Ultimately, these factors may have caused Chavez to distrust the United States enough to strengthen military ties with Russia.

First and foremost, many will likely disregard the following analysis based off the fact that Hugo Chavez continues to ally himself militarily with Russia even though President Obama has already attempted to acknowledge some of the past mistakes of the United States within Latin America. They of course are referring to Obama’s speech at the Summit of the Americas last year where he addressed the concerns of many Latin American leaders. During this speech Obama’s words echoed the importance of fostering trust with the attending nations. Obama went on to say that:

…promises of partnership have gone unfulfilled in the past and that trust has to be earned over time. While the United States has done much to promote peace and prosperity in the hemisphere, we have at times been disengaged, and at times we sought to dictate our terms. But I pledge to you that we seek an equal partnership…There is no senior partner and junior partner in our relations; there is simply engagement based on mutual respect and common interests and shared values. So I'm here to launch a new chapter of engagement that will be sustained throughout my administration… (Malcolm)

While Obama’s words are an extremely important beginning to a much needed healing process, it still remains to be seen as to how the U.S. plans to back up his statements with actions that will prove this commitment. Also, much of Obama’s words are far too ambiguous to know if he’s talking about the entirety of U.S. involvement in Latin America or if he’s simply stating that his presidency will be different from the Bush years. While the immediate history within Latin America, especially the history between U.S. and Venezuela, has suffered from extreme hostilities, one cannot overlook the distant wounds of history that many Central and South American nations have suffered at the hands of U.S. interests’. Certainly, the United States has been a force for much good, as well as a champion of democracy in the world. It would be a simplistic view to ignore this fact, but it would be an equally simplistic view not to attempt to understand the ethical implications of U.S. actions, and how they have caused many people within Latin America to distrust the United States – regardless of who’s in office. By closely examining some of these actions one will hopefully be able to appreciate the historical perspective held by a polarizing figure like Hugo Chavez. In addition to this, one should also see the obvious parallels that current U.S. actions have with the actions of the past, and how the combination of the both are the reasons behind the Russian and Venezuelan military alliance. This new found appreciation should lead to the conclusion that it might be an appropriate time to take a new approach that goes beyond mere apologetic words by acting in a manner that is empathetic to the historical feelings of a continent. Unquestionably, Chavez may continue to purchase weapons from the Russians even if the U.S. government takes this new approach, but nevertheless the effort may perhaps be worth trying.

In order to fully grasp the situation, it’s important to understand that during the Venezuelan leader’s first encounter with President Obama it became quite apparent that Chavez’s distrust of the United States originated from his perspective of history. At one point in this meeting Chavez handed Obama a copy of Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent, by Uruguayan author and Latin American historian, Eduardo Galeano. Galeano not only writes about the arrival of Columbus to Hispaniola in 1492, as well as the violent and oppressive rule of the Spanish conquistadors that followed thereafter, but also about U.S. and other Western influences in Latin America. In later chapters, Galeano explores U.S. actions in Latin America, explaining that “U.S. concerns took over lands, customs houses, treasuries, and governments; Marines landed here, there, and everywhere,” and this was all done in the name of “protect[ing] the lives and interests of U.S. citizens” (108). Due to the subject matter of Galeano’s book, and the fact that it is peppered with passages similar to the aforementioned excerpt, Chavez has given Obama a glimpse into his historical perspective. Moreover, the BBC quoted Chavez as saying Galeano’s “book is a monument in…Latin American history. It allows us to learn history, and we have to build on this history” (“Chavez Effect Creates Bestseller”). Not only does Chavez’s comment verify his desire for his historical perspective to be acknowledged and hopefully accepted by a U.S. president, but it also directly reveals his need for U.S. and Venezuelan relations to move forward from this understanding of history. But what is this understanding of history, and more importantly why would events that took place decades or possibly centuries ago cause him to distrust the United States?

For many people, like Hugo Chavez, the United States has historically been seen as undermining democracy in Latin America, and this is the main reason for growing distrust, as well as anti-American sentiments in the region. According to Galeano, Latin American history in the 1900’s was filled with U.S. led “invasions, interventions, bombardments, forced loans, and gun point treaties” (107). One of the best examples of a U.S. led intervention in Latin American politics took place during 1954 when there was growing concern within the United States government about Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. After being democratically elected to office, Arbenz began to follow through on his campaign promise of redistributing land to landless Guatemalans. According to Economist writer Michael Reid’s book, Forgotten Continent: The Battle For Latin America’s Soul, the main concern was that Arbenz’s “land reform would create a base for the communists in the countryside,” and that such a threat would endanger democracy in the region making U.S. intervention even more urgent (85). In response to Arbenz’s actions, President Eisenhower gave the CIA permission “to organize the takeover of Guatemala’s government” and as a result “U.S.-trained pilots bombed…Guatemala City” (Whitford). However, the toppling of Arbenz’s government was short lived, as the military leader chosen by the United States was eventually killed and “succeeded by a series of ruthless dictators” (Whitford). Regardless of how correct the U.S. was in its’ justification for overthrowing Arbenz, the only thing the U.S. succeeded in doing was “crush[ing] democracy not communism in Guatemala” (Reid 85). Even though the historical events of 1954 are only one example of intervention, it doesn’t weaken Chavez’s perspective because for many the actions in Guatemala are symptomatic of a reoccurring theme in the United States’ history within the region. Based off of this perspective it’s easy to see how Chavez may suspect the U.S. of having ill intentions towards him and his Venezuelan government.

With that in mind, one can understand the difficulty that the Obama administration, or any future administration for that matter, will have at not only mending Chavez’s historical perspective, but also fixing the tense diplomatic relations that Venezuela had with the Bush administration. According to New York Times journalist, David Stout, Chavez expressed his distrust of U.S. policies during his 2006 UN speech by calling Bush the “devil” and “the spokesman of imperialism” (Stout). Chavez’s constant American imperialist rhetoric only resulted in the Bush administration categorizing the Venezuelan leader as a radical, a label that has been used to describe the president of Iran. This in turn created more fuel for Chavez’s long winded anti-American speeches.

However, the turbulent nature of this relationship was much more than merely Chavez’s charged words, in fact there were also the various accusations he made about Bush’s plots to overthrow him. In September 2008, Rory Carroll of The Guardian reported that Chavez “ordered the US ambassador to leave Venezuela within 72 hours and accused Washington of fomenting a coup attempt against his socialist revolution” (Carroll). While the U.S. has denied any involvement in such a plot, the alleged coup attempt “[c]oincidental or not…fell on the 35th anniversary of the CIA-backed coup which replaced Chile's leftist president, Salvador Allende, with the dictator Augusto Pinochet” (Carroll). Regardless of how paranoid Chavez might be, one must understand that he has already survived a previous coup attempt in 2002 that temporarily removed him from power. Even though it has never been proven that either the 2002 coup attempt or the alleged plot of 2008 were orchestrated by Washington, he may still be justified in his paranoia if one is to recall the 1954 coup in Guatemala. Avoiding future incidents such as this may prove difficult for the current administration since Chavez “believe[s] Obama has the same stench” as Bush (Silva). Furthermore, it is likely Chavez also believes that Obama has the same desire for removing Latin American governments that other U.S. administrations had in the past.

Furthering Chavez’s distrust of the United States is the strong military alliance between the U.S. and Colombia. This bordering country has an extremely volatile history with Chavez, and the fact that the U.S. has a strong partnership with Colombia is only making matters worse. According to Reuters journalist Hugh Bronstein, The Obama administration proved last October that the U.S. was dedicated to Colombia’s security when both countries signed an official agreement “increasing U.S. access to military bases in the South American country” (“Columbia, U.S. Sign Military Cooperation Deal”). Bronstein later reported that the new U.S.-Colombian deal resulted in Chavez “order[ing] his army to prepare for war in order to assure peace” (“Colombia Turns to U.N., OAS After Venezuela War Talk”). This didn’t amount to much more than Chavez beating his chest, but it did frighten Colombian President Alvaro Uribe enough to go to the United Nations for help. It still remains to be seen as to how this will all play out, but New York Times journalist Simon Romero stated that “depending on how the accord is put in place, American troop levels in Colombia could climb sharply,” and Chavez is so threatened by this deal that he has called it a “new aggression against” Venezuela (“Increased U.S. Military Presence in Colombia Could Pose Problems With Neighbors”). Obviously, the U.S. has every right to protect Colombia, especially since it’s the strongest partner in the region and an ally that is of vital importance, but the increased military presence in Colombia, a country that borders Venezuela, is somewhat reminiscent to U.S. actions in the 1954 Guatemalan coup, in which “the CIA assembled, armed, and trained an invasion force in neighboring Honduras” (Whitford). Without a doubt, this growing alliance is becoming increasingly ominous to Chavez, so much so that the Venezuelan government has sought to counter this perceived intimidation through a strong partnership with a powerful and influential ally.

Due to the mounting fears of the U.S.-Colombian alliance, and growing distrust of the United States, the Venezuelan government has forged a strong military bond with Russia. Voice of America News reported that the new found partnership has allowed Chavez to buy “$4 billion of Russian arms, including fighter jets, Mi-17 helicopters and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles,” and more recently he has discussed purchasing an additional “$5 billion worth of weapons” with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (“Russia, Venezuela Strengthen”). Moreover, Chavez’s intentions were made clear when he said that these “purchases are to counter U.S. influence in Latin America, especially in Colombia” (“Russia, Venezuela Strengthen”). According to a BBC report, the Venezuelan leader stated that the numerous military deals with Russia are “because the North American empire... has plans to invade Venezuela, [and] to disarm Venezuela” (“Chavez Calls For Russia Alliance”). In Chavez’s mind the former Soviet Union was the only world power that has historically ever stood against the United States. It’s likely that the Venezuelan leader holds a romanticized account of the Cuban-Missile Crisis, as one cannot ignore the symbolic nature that the Russian-Venezuelan military alliance has. Such a deal has likely made Colombia’s government uneasy, and could threaten the stability of the region. Furthermore, the Russian and Venezuelan union wouldn’t even exist if Chavez had stronger trust in the United States, or if he had a clear understanding of Washington’s intentions were in Colombia.

Of course the validity of Chavez’s perspective of the United States in Latin America is debatable. However, the issue isn’t whether he is right or wrong, but that he has this historical perspective to begin with. In order to eliminate speculation of U.S. intentions’ in the region the U.S. should address concerns by taking actions that refute any fears of invasion Chavez might have. Certainly, one mustn’t’ get stuck in an illogical state of mind where one blames America for every evil in the world. Likewise, one shouldn’t ignore past mistakes, as well as actions that parallel these actions. The United States should remind Venezuela of the good qualities of the American people by acting in manner that reflects these qualities, and that historically the United States has stood for peace and justice within the world. Such redeeming actions would force Chavez to confront his historical perspective, and hopefully realize that the west has turned the page on history. By doing so the U.S. will not be seen as a weakened apologist nation, but rather, as a forward thinking nation of action that is able to move beyond what it once was in order to become a transformational symbol. One way to back-up Obama’s speech at the Summit of the Americas with actions would be to eliminate the current military treaty between the U.S. and Colombia. By returning troop levels to where they were prior to this deal Obama will remove any thoughts of similarities between present day actions and the coup attempts of the past. This would also reduce the need for Chavez to strengthen ties with the Russian military. If Chavez’s distrust continues on the path that it’s been heading for the past decade then diplomacy with the U.S. and Colombia will only get worse, and this could threaten the stability of the region starting an arms-race in the south-western hemisphere. Whether Chavez accepts the United States’ future gestures as a strengthening of relations is up to him, but trust is a two-way street, and the U.S. will certainly have plenty of expectations for him to uphold once his trust is reestablished.

Works Cited

Bronstein, Hugh. “Colombia Turns to U.N., OAS After Venezuela War Talk.” Reuters. 9 Nov. 2009. Thomson Reuters. Web. 12 Jun. 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A80B020091109>
Bronstein, Hugh. “Columbia, U.S. Sign Military Cooperation Deal.” Reuters. 30 Oct. 2009. Thomson Reuters. Web. 11 Jun. 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59T1S720091030>
Carroll, Rory. “Venezuela: Hugo Chavez expels US ambassador amid claims of coup plot.” The Guardian. 12 Sep. 2008. Guardian News and Media Limited 2010. Web. 8 Jun. 2010. <>
“Chavez Calls For Russia Alliance.” The BBC. 22 Jul. 2008. MMX. Web 12 Jun. 2010. <>
“Chavez Effect Creates Bestseller.” The BBC. 20 Apr. 2009. MMX. Web. 8 Jun. 2010. <>
Galeano, Eduardo. Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent. New York. Monthly Review Press, 1997: 107-108. Print.
Malcom, Andrews. “Obama Tells Leaders of Americas the U.S. is too disengaged, Dictorial.” The LA Times. 18 Apr. 2009. A Tribune Website. Web. 15 Jun. 2010
Reid, Michael. Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007: 85. Print.
Romero, Simon. “Chavez Threatens to End Oil Exports to U.S. in Exxon Fued.” The New York Times. 11 Feb. 2008. New York Times Company. Web. 8 Jun. 2010.
Works Cited
Romero, Simon. “Increased U.S. Military Presence in Colombia Could Pose Problems With Neighbors.” The New York Times. 22 Jul. 2009. New York Times Company. Web. 12 Jun. 2010. <>
"Russia, Venezuela Strengthen Economic, Political Ties. " Voice of America News / FIND 7 Apr. 2010: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 7 Jun. 2010.
Silva, Jorge. “Venezuela’s Chavez says Obama has ‘Stench’ of Bush.” Reuters. 18 Jan. 2009. Thomas Reuters Corporate. Web. 9 Jun. 2010.
Stout, David. “Chavez Calls Bush ‘the Devil’ in UN Speech.” The New York Times. 20 Sep. 2006. New York Times Company. Web. 9 Jun. 2010.
Whitford, Ellen, and Manning, Steven. "1954: Coup in Guatemala." Scholastic Update. 11 Mar. 1988: Research Library, ProQuest. Web. 10 Jun. 2010.

Reassessing the realities of terrorism

Professors John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart believe that the threat of terrorism is Hardly Existential:

...[A]nnual terrorism fatality risks, particularly for areas outside of war zones, are less than one in one million and therefore generally lie within the range regulators deem safe or acceptable, requiring no further regulations, particularly those likely to be expensive. They are similar to the risks of using home appliances (200 deaths per year in the United States) or of commercial aviation (103 deaths per year). Compared with dying at the hands of a terrorist, Americans are twice as likely to perish in a natural disaster and nearly a thousand times more likely to be killed in some type of accident. The same general conclusion holds when the full damage inflicted by terrorists -- not only the loss of life but direct and indirect economic costs -- is aggregated. As a hazard, terrorism, at least outside of war zones, does not inflict enough damage to justify substantially increasing expenditures to deal with it.

Because they are so blatantly intentional, deaths resulting from terrorism do, of course, arouse special emotions. And they often have wide political ramifications, as citizens demand that politicians "do something." Many people therefore consider them more significant and more painful to endure than deaths by other causes. But quite a few dangers, particularly ones concerning pollution and nuclear power plants, also stir considerable political and emotional feelings, and these have been taken into account by regulators when devising their assessments of risk acceptability. Moreover, the table also includes another kind of hazard that arouses strong emotions and is intentional -- homicide -- and its frequency generally registers, unlike terrorism, in the unacceptable category.

More Security Problems Facing Afghanistan

The Independent reports that there are some serious problems plaguing the Afghan National Police.

Corruption, desertion and drug abuse within the Afghan police are threatening its ability to take over the fight against the Taliban and the UK's chances of an exit from the country, government documents show.

A series of internal Foreign Office papers obtained by The Independent on Sunday lay bare the deep concerns of British officials over the standard of recruits to the Afghan National Police (ANP), ranging from high casualty rates and illiteracy to poor vetting and low pay.

The reasoning behind allowing, otherwise unfit applicants to join the ANP was caused by "... a focus on quantity rather than quality." Certainly, this sheds some much needed light on the massive security holes that need to be filled in order for real and lasting stability to return to Afghanistan.


(Read the full article here)